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Assertion	and	Transparent	Self-Knowledge		Eric	Marcus		Auburn	University	marcuea@auburn.edu	 John	Schwenkler		Florida	State	University	jschwenkler@fsu.edu		1.		 Belief	is	a	psychological	state	or	attitude,	and	thus	for	a	person	to	know	what	she	believes	is	for	her	to	know	herself	to	be	in	a	certain	state,	or	to	have	a	certain	attitude	toward	how	things	are.	Doxastic	self-knowledge	is	therefore	knowledge	of	psychological	reality.	And	it	is	natural	to	conclude	from	this	that	this	knowledge	must	be	justified	through	an	empirical	process,	i.e.	‘a	process	in	which	one	observes	or	detects	one’s	own	mental	states’	(Gertler	2011a,	255).		According	to	this	natural	line	of	thought,	just	as	I	can	only	come	to	know	what	you	believe	by	watching	your	deliberate	actions,	observing	how	you	respond	automatically	to	certain	stimuli,	and	keeping	track	of	what	you	assert,	so	in	order	for	me	to	know	what	I	believe	my	doxastic	states	must	somehow	be	made	manifest	to	me.	Our	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	challenge	this	last	assumption.	We	refer	to	the	position	in	question	as	the	empirical	conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge,	since	according	to	it	knowledge	of	one’s	beliefs,	if	it	is	to	be	knowledge	at	all,	must	be	a	kind	of	empirical	knowledge,	or	knowledge	that	is	grounded	in	evidence.1	On	the	empirical	conception,	what	accounts	for	the	special	character	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	not	that	this	knowledge	is	non-empirical,	but	rather	the	kind	of	empirical	grounding	it	possesses.	In	particular,	self-knowledge	is	thought	to	be	different	from	knowledge	of	other	minds	because	only	in	one’s	own	case	does	one	have	direct	or	‘first-personal’	access	to	thoughts,	feelings,	and	urges	that	are	manifested	only	ambiguously	in	one’s	overt	behavior.	The	distinctively	first-personal	character	of	this	evidence,	plus	the	fact	that	it	is	(allegedly)	abundant	and	(again,	allegedly)	less	subject	to	misinterpretation,	is	supposed	to	put	a	person	in	a	position	to	know	her	own	beliefs	in	a	way	that	no	one	else	can.	Even	if	this	knowledge	is	not	exhaustive	or	infallible,	the	empirical	conception	is	supposed	to	account	for	how	a	person	usually	knows	more	about	her	beliefs	that	anyone	else	can,	and	how	this	self-knowledge	is	usually	more	secure	than	anyone	else’s	knowledge	of																																																									1	What	we	call	the	empirical	conception	is	equivalent	to	what	Gertler	(2011a)	calls	
empiricism	about	self-knowledge.	We	prefer	our	terminology	because	we	deny	that	what	Gertler	calls	‘rationalism’	is	the	only	alternative	to	it.	We	wish	to	emphasize	that	in	rejecting	the	empirical	conception	we	do	not	deny	that	what	is	known	(viz.,	the	thinker’s	belief)	in	an	instance	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	an	empirical	fact.	Rather,	our	claim	is	that	the	process	by	which	such	facts	are	known	is	not	empirical	in	the	sense	just	spelled	out.		
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her	beliefs	will	be.	Nevertheless,	according	to	the	empirical	conception,	knowledge	of	one’s	own	beliefs	is	similar	to	knowledge	of	the	beliefs	of	others	insofar	as	both	are	justified	through	evidence.	It	is,	on	the	empirical	conception,	the	difference	in	the	character	and	extent	of	the	evidence	available	to	the	believer	herself	that	is	the	ground	of	first-person	authority.2	
 Our	paper	will	argue	against	this	position	by	exploring	the	connection	between	self-knowledge	and	assertion.	The	empirical	conception	is	false,	we	will	argue,	because	it	cannot	account	for	the	way	that	a	person	is	ordinarily	able	to	express	her	beliefs	by	asserting	their	content.		Honest	assertion	is	speaking	one’s	
mind.	And	this	requires	knowledge	that	one	is	in	the	state	of	mind	that	one	speaks	from.	But	speaking	one’s	mind	is	not	speaking	about	one’s	mind,	and	so	evidence	
that	one	believes	something	cannot	put	one	in	a	position	honestly	to	assert	what	one	believes.	Rather,	it	is	a	condition	of	honest	assertion	that	a	person’s	grasp	of	the	belief	she	asserts	be	grounded	non-empirically,	i.e.	not	in	any	sort	of	evidence	at	all.		2.	 Contemporary	discussions	of	assertion	often	focus	on	the	knowledge	norm:			(KA)	Assert	that	p	only	if	you	know	that	p.																																																										2	As	is	often	the	case	with	widespread	assumptions,	the	thesis	that	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	a	kind	of	empirical	knowledge	is	not	usually	formulated	or	defended	as	such	in	the	philosophical	literature.	But	looking	closely	one	can	see	how	this	empirical	conception	is	shared	ground	among	a	range	of	otherwise	differing	accounts	of	first-person	authority.	Gilbert	Ryle’s	behaviorist	view	in	The	Concept	of	
Mind	(1949)	and	D.M.	Armstrong’s	account	of	introspection	in	Belief,	Truth	and	
Knowledge	(1973)	are	cases	in	point:	while	Armstrong	grounds	self-knowledge	in	a	dedicated	faculty	through	which	beliefs	and	other	mental	items	are	brought	to	consciousness,	and	Ryle	denies	that	there	is	any	such	faculty,	both	assume	that	there	is	some	way	in	which	self-knowledge	results	from	tracking	sources	of	information	(or,	as	Ryle	puts	it,	‘data’)	about	one’s	states	of	mind.	More	recently,	Peter	Carruthers	joins	Ryle	in	rejecting	any	appeal	to	a	faculty	of	direct	introspection,	but	on	his	interpretive	account	of	self-knowledge	the	reliability	of	self-attributions	is	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	‘we	almost	always	have	a	great	deal	more	evidence	available	to	us	when	we	interpret	ourselves	than	when	we	interpret	others’	(2010,	105).		And	Quassim	Cassam	has	recently	advanced	an	account	on	which	self-knowledge	is	a	species	of	inferential	knowledge:	‘In	the	most	straightforward	case,’	he	writes,	‘you	know	that	you	have	[an	attitude]	A	insofar	as	you	have	access	to	evidence	that	you	have	A	and	you	infer	from	your	evidence	that	you	have	A’	(2016,	138).		Despite	their	differences,	all	of	these	accounts	conceive	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	as	justified	by	an	empirical	process	in	the	sense	we	have	defined.	
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	Simplifying	somewhat,	there	are	two	ways	of	failing	to	conform	to	(KA).	One	is	by	asserting	something	you	merely	believe	but	do	not	know,	which	is	epistemically	irresponsible.3	The	other	is	by	asserting	something	that	you	don’t	even	believe,	which	is	dishonest.4	Philosophers	discussing	the	norms	of	assertion	have	typically	focused	on	the	requirement	of	epistemic	responsibility—for	example,	they	have	considered	whether	acceptable	assertion	really	does	require	knowledge,	or	simply	justification,	and	so	on	(see,	e.g.,	Williamson	[2000],	Weiner	[2005],	and	Kvanvig	[2009]).	Our	concern,	however,	is	not	with	this,	but	solely	with	what	is	required	for	assertion	to	be	honest,	and	thus	with	conditions	of	satisfying	the	following	norm:		(BA)	Assert	that	p	only	if	you	believe	that	p.		We	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	as	with	most	(if	not	all)	norms	it	might	sometimes	be	best,	all	things	considered,	to	violate	(BA).	If	this	is	true	it	does	not	show	that	(BA)	is	not	a	norm	governing	honesty,	but	only	that	it	might	sometimes	be	best	to	be	dishonest,	i.e.	to	assert	something	that	one	does	not	believe—as	if,	say,	the	Nazi	at	the	door	asks	whether	there	are	any	Jews	in	your	attic.	Thus	we	put	(BA)	forward	only	as	an	articulation	of	the	norm	governing	assertion	where	the	requirement	to	be	honest	is	not	trumped	by	other	considerations.5	The	rule	is	not	intended	as	a	guide	to	acceptable	assertion	in	general.	It	captures	part	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	one	important	feature	that	assertion	often	aims	at,	namely	honesty.		 It	is	because	assertion	is	an	action,	something	that	a	person	does	rather	than	something	that	merely	happens,	that	norms	for	assertion	take	the	form	of	rules	that	one	who	asserts	can	choose	whether	or	not	to	follow.	This	is	why	(BA)	is	formulated	in	the	imperative	mood:	it	tells	a	person	what	to	do	in	order	to	avoid	asserting	dishonestly.	And	this	is	the	first	step	toward	seeing	the	connection	between	honesty	and	doxastic	self-knowledge.	For	in	order	to	hold	oneself	to	the	rule	(BA)—to	obey	this	imperative,	to	follow	the	rule	as	opposed	to	merely	conforming	to	it—one	who	asserts	must	understand	whether	or	not	the	conditions	it	specifies	are	satisfied.	And	this	shows	that	honest	assertion	requires	a	grasp	of	one’s	own	beliefs:	a	person	who																																																									3	Goldberg	describes	such	an	act	as	‘reckless’.	See	Goldberg	(2015,	ch.	6.)	4	Things	will	be	more	complicated	if	knowledge	does	not	require	belief	(see,	e.g.,	Schwitzgebel	and	Myers-Shulz	[2013]).	Still	it	seems	that	on	such	a	view	there	will	be	some	attitude	short	of	knowledge—if	not	belief,	then	perhaps	something	like	acceptance	in	a	context—that	suffices	for	honest	assertion,	and	our	arguments	below	will	apply	in	turn	to	such	a	requirement.	5	On	the	defeasibility	of	norms	of	assertion,	see	Kvanvig	(2009).	
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was	‘self-blind’	to	her	doxastic	attitudes	would	be	in	no	position	to	follow	(BA),	since	she	could	not	tell	whether	she	believed	what	she	was	asserting.		 We	can	give	further	support	to	this	preliminary	conclusion	by	reflecting	on	a	hypothetical	case.	Begin	by	imagining	a	man	to	whom	it	is	vitally	important	that	he	believe	that	he	has	lived	an	enviable	life.	However,	‘deep	down’	the	man	does	not	believe	this,	but	rather	believes	that	he	spent	much	of	his	childhood	living	in	fear	of	his	father’s	anger	and	disapproval.	This	belief	overwhelms	him	with	shame,	and	it	is	precisely	this	shame	that	makes	it	so	important	for	the	man	to	believe	that	his	life	has	been	wonderful.	He	has	for	a	long	time	managed	to	avoid	thinking	about	the	horror	of	his	childhood,	repressing	his	uncomfortable	beliefs	in	a	way	that	suits	the	false	self-conception	to	which	he	clings—a	conception	according	to	which,	contrary	to	fact,	he	is	really	very	happy	with	his	childhood.6	Yet	this	repression	has	not	changed	the	man’s	actual	beliefs	about	his	childhood;	it	is	only	a	way	of	keeping	himself	from	bringing	them	to	mind.	When	he	reflects	on	questions	that	bear	on	the	quality	of	his	life-experience—even	the	question	of	whether	he	had	a	happy	childhood—his	answers	reflect	his	distorted	self-conception,	rather	than	his	repressed	beliefs.	So	although	this	man	believes	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood,	this	belief	lies	outside	his	ken.		So	far	described,	the	situation	of	the	man	we	have	just	imagined	constitutes	the	Basic	Case	whose	details	we	will	vary	in	several	ways	as	our	argument	proceeds.	In	our	first	variant	on	that	case,	suppose	that	this	man	finds	himself	listening	to	a	friend	bemoan	her	very	unhappy	childhood.	This	testimony	might	have	brought	to	mind	the	man’s	belief	that	his	own	childhood	was	unhappy	as	well,	but	instead	it	prompts	him	to	tell	himself	how	very	happy	he	is	with	the	way	his	life	has	gone.	Despite	this,	in	an	effort	to	appear	sympathetic	to	his	friend	the	man	says	to	her:	‘I	too	had	an	unhappy	childhood’.	Call	this	the	case	of	the	Would-Be	Liar.	The	essential	thing	to	see	is	that	in	speaking	as	he	does,	the	Would-Be	Liar	asserts	
what	he	believes—since	as	we	described	the	Basic	Case	this	person	does	in	fact	believe	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Clearly,	however,	the	Would-Be	Liar	does	not	speak	honestly	when	he	asserts	this,	since	his	purpose	in	speaking	is	to	mislead	his	friend	as	to	what	his	own	life	was	like.	The	Would-Be	Liar	has	not	followed	the	rule	(BA),	despite	having	acted	in	conformity	with	it.	This	example	shows	that	an	assertion	is	not	honest	just	because	what	the	speaker	asserts	is	what	she	in	fact	believes.	In	order	to	speak	honestly,	one’s	assertion	and	one’s	belief	must	not	correspond	merely	by	accident.			 The	case	of	the	Would-Be	Liar	brings	into	focus	the	question	that	we	will	consider	in	more	detail	below:	What	is	required,	beyond	merely	having	a	belief	in																																																									6	Whether	this	‘managing’	involves	intentional	action,	subpersonal	mechanisms,	or	some	combination	of	the	two	need	not	concern	us	here.	
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what	one	asserts,	for	an	assertion	to	be	honest?	In	particular,	what	sort	of	grasp	of	one’s	belief	does	honest	assertion	require?		3.	 It	is	tempting	to	suggest	that	the	reason	it	is	not	honest	for	the	Would-Be	Liar	to	say	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood,	even	though	he	does	in	fact	believe	this,	is	simply	that	he	is	ignorant	of	his	belief—that	is,	the	problem	is	simply	that	he	does	not	believe	that	he	has	this	belief.	Let	us	suppose	that	this	is	so	far	correct:	the	Would-Be	Liar	does	not	have	such	a	second-order	belief.	And	now	let	us	ask:	Would	
believing	that	he	believes	that	his	childhood	was	unhappy	be	enough	for	the	Would-Be	Liar	to	assert	honestly	that	this	was	so?	Not	necessarily.	Consider	the	Lucky	Spiritualist,	who	as	in	the	Basic	Case	has	a	repressed	belief	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	The	Lucky	Spiritualist	visits	his	psychic,	who	tells	the	Spiritualist	that	he	(the	Spiritualist)	believes	his	childhood	was	unhappy.	And	now	suppose	that	solely	for	this	reason,	the	Spiritualist	ascribes	this	belief	to	himself.	Unlike	the	Would-Be	Liar,	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	believes	that	he	believes	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Despite	this,	it	seems	clear	that	if	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	were	to	tell	someone	that	his	childhood	was	unhappy,	this	still	would	not	be	an	honest	assertion.		For	the	most	that	the	psychic’s	testimony	could	put	the	Spiritualist	in	a	position	to	assert	honestly	(if	irresponsibly)	is	exactly	what	she	tells	him,	namely	that	he	believes	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	This	is	because	the	psychic	tells	the	Spiritualist	nothing	about	his	childhood	itself,	but	only	about	his	state	of	mind	towards	it—whereas	it	is	his	
childhood	that	the	man	would	be	describing	if	he	said	that	his	childhood	was	unhappy.	Because	of	this,	even	though	the	Spiritualist	meets	the	condition	just	stipulated—he	not	only	believes,	but	also	believes	that	he	believes,	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood—he	still	cannot	honestly	assert	this.	Nor	will	it	close	the	gap	if	we	suppose	that	the	man’s	belief	about	his	belief	is	grounded	in	something	more	reliable	than	the	testimony	of	a	psychic.	Consider	the	
Faithful	Patient,	who	is	otherwise	just	like	the	Lucky	Spiritualist,	but	is	told	not	by	his	psychic	but	by	his	highly	skilled	therapist	that	he	(the	Patient)	believes	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Suppose	the	Faithful	Patient	ascribes	this	belief	to	himself	on	the	strength	of	the	therapist’s	testimony.	We	can	imagine	that	the	therapist	possesses	excellent	evidence	about	the	Patient’s	belief	as	it	is	manifested	in	his	unguarded	behaviors,	so	that	in	virtue	of	this	diagnosis	the	Faithful	Patient	
knows	that	he	believes	that	his	childhood	was	unhappy.	Nevertheless	the	Faithful	Patient	cannot,	just	on	the	strength	of	this	testimony,	honestly	assert	what	he	knows	himself	to	believe,	viz.,	that	his	childhood	was	unhappy.	For	no	matter	the	quality	of	the	evidence	provided	by	the	therapist’s	diagnosis	of	the	Patient’s	beliefs	about	his	childhood,	if	the	Patient	knows	of	those	beliefs	only	in	this	way	he	is	not	in	a	position	to	assert	honestly	that	things	are	as	he	believes	them	to	be.	There	is,	then,	
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more	to	the	norm	of	honesty	than	the	requirement	that	one	assert	only	something	that	one	knows	oneself	to	believe.		4.	 At	this	point	it	is	worth	offering	a	preliminary	diagnosis	of	why	it	is	that	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	or	Faithful	Patient	cannot	honestly	assert	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	To	do	this,	let	us	draw	on	a	pair	of	cases	described	by	Jonathan	Dancy	(2000,	125),	which	he	in	turn	credits	to	John	Hyman.	First	there	is	Zoe,	who	calls	the	zookeeper	because	she	believes	there	is	an	elephant	in	her	bathtub.	Zoe’s	action	makes	sense	if	we	see	it	as	the	action	of	someone	who	believes	that	an	elephant	is	in	her	bathtub	and	then	acts,	as	we	will	put	it,	from	the	point	of	view	of	this	belief—or	through	its	lens,	so	to	speak.	Zoe	calls	the	zookeeper	in	light	of	what	she	believes,	namely	that	there	is	an	elephant	in	her	bathtub.	And	it	is	this	(putative)	fact	that	she	takes	to	justify	her	action—an	action	that	is	an	attempt	to	do	something	that	will	get	rid	of	the	elephant.	In	contrast	to	Zoe’s	case	consider	also	that	of	Silas,	who	believes	that	there	is	an	elephant	in	his	bathtub	and	therefore	places	a	call,	not	to	the	zookeeper,	but	rather	to	his	trusted	psychiatrist.	Silas	differs	from	Zoe	in	that	the	position	of	the	supposed	elephant	is	not	at	issue	in	what	he	does—for	it	is	rather	his	belief	about	the	elephant	that	he	is	trying	to	get	rid	of.	To	make	sense	of	Silas	we	need	to	appeal	to	his	psychotic	belief	but	not,	as	with	Zoe,	as	an	attitude	that	characterizes	the	point	
of	view	from	which	he	acts.	We	can	mark	this	difference	by	saying	that	Silas	calls	the	psychiatrist	in	light	of	his	belief	rather	than	from	its	point	of	view,	or	through	the	lens	on	the	world	that	it	provides.	Whereas	Zoe	will	justify	her	action	by	appeal	to	the	believed	fact	that	there	is	an	elephant	in	the	bathtub,	Silas	will	justify	his	by	the	believed	fact	that	he	believes	this.			The	relevance	of	these	cases	to	those	of	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	and	Faithful	Patient	should	be	clear.	Like	Silas,	neither	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	and	Faithful	Patient	can	reasonably	act	from	the	point	of	view	of	his	belief	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Yet	this	is	just	the	kind	of	act	that	honest	assertion	is:	in	asserting	that	p	one	says	something	about	the	world,	just	as	in	calling	the	zookeeper	Zoe	is	attempting	to	do	something	about	the	elephant.	As	we	described	their	situations,	the	most	that	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	or	Faithful	Patient	can	reasonably	do	is	take	steps	to	do	something	about	his	belief,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	he	believes	this.	These	steps	might	include	finding	out	whether	the	belief	itself	is	true—and	then,	perhaps,	describing	that	reality	in	turn.	Yet	as	long	as	all	he	goes	on	is	the	testimony	of	a	psychic	or	a	therapist	about	his	own	attitudes,	the	man	cannot	honestly	assert	that	his	childhood	was	as	he	believes	it	to	be,	despite	the	fact	that	he	believes	or	knows	that	he	believes	this.	
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Our	task,	then,	is	to	characterize	the	distinctive	form	of	self-understanding	that	makes	it	possible	to	speak	honestly	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	belief,	where	this	involves	something	more	than	knowingly	saying	what	one	actually	believes.			5.	 Let	us	ask	again:	What	more	is	required	for	honest	assertion	than	the	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs	that	is	possessed	by	the	Lucky	Spiritualist	or	Faithful	Patient—or,	for	that	matter,	by	someone	like	Silas?	A	simple	answer	is	that	the	Spiritualist	and	Patient	grasp	their	beliefs	only	in	an	alienated	or	‘third-personal’	way,	i.e.	a	way	that	would	put	any	other	person	in	receipt	of	the	same	testimony	in	the	same	position	as	the	Spiritualist	and	Patient	themselves.	And	clearly	a	third	party	who	overheard,	say,	the	therapist’s	testimony	about	the	Faithful	Patient’s	belief	could	not	then	assert	that	the	Patient	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Does	the	fact	that	the	Faithful	Patient	is	also	a	mere	‘observer’	of	his	attitude	explain	why	he	cannot	honestly	assert	it?		 There	are	two	ways	of	developing	this	simple	answer,	one	of	which	we	accept	while	finding	the	other	inadequate.	The	inadequate	diagnosis	is	the	one	that	proceeds	from	the	assumption	that	we	outlined	at	the	start	of	this	paper,	that	doxastic	self-knowledge	must	be	grounded	in	evidence.	So	long	as	one	accepts	this	assumption	it	will	seem	that	the	trouble	with	the	Faithful	Patient	is	simply	that	the	
evidence	that	grounds	his	second-order	belief	is	insufficiently	first-personal—that	is,	the	trouble	is	that	his	evidence	is	of	the	second-	or	third-personal	kind,	whereas	properly	first-personal	evidence	would	do	the	trick.	By	contrast,	our	more	radical	diagnosis	is	that	a	truly	first-personal	grasp	of	what	one	believes	is	not	grounded	in	evidence	at	all.	To	see	why	we	favor	this	more	radical	proposal,	consider	one	last	variant	on	our	Basic	Case,	in	which	the	role	of	the	Faithful	Patient’s	therapist	is	occupied	by	the	subject	himself,	and	where	the	process	through	which	he	comes	to	know	his	beliefs	arises	directly	from	subjective	access	to	his	own	‘internal’	thoughts,	feelings,	urges,	and	so	on.	Call	this	person	the	Perceptive	Introspector.	The	Introspector	notices	how	he	becomes	curiously	distracted	when	someone	asks	directly	about	his	childhood,	and	how	he	always	tends	to	think	instead	of	how	well-prepared	for	success	he	emerged	as	a	young	adult.	He	also	notices	that	although	he	is	an	enthusiastic	film	buff,	when	invited	to	see	films	such	as	the	400	Blows	or	Pather	
Panchali,	films	he	knows	to	be	about	difficult	childhoods,	he	always	finds	himself	unaccountably	yearning	to	do	something	else.	It	strikes	him	that	these	and	similar	reactions	reveal	that	he	believes	himself	to	have	had	an	unhappy	childhood,	while	wishing	to	avoid	being	conscious	of	this	belief.	This	knowledge	is	reached	in	a	way	that	is	available	to	no	one	else,	since	no	one	else	but	the	Introspector	can	have	direct	access	to	his	thoughts,	feelings,	and	inclinations.	Despite	this,	the	knowledge	still	will	not	put	the	Introspector	in	a	position	to	assert	that	he	had	an	unhappy	
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childhood.	For	the	position	of	the	Perceptive	Introspector	is	really	no	different	from	that	of	Silas,	the	Faithful	Patient,	or	the	Lucky	Spiritualist:	his	relation	to	his	belief	about	his	childhood	is	such	that	he	cannot	honestly	speak	from	its	point	of	view—despite	the	fact	that	this	is	a	belief	he	actually	holds,	and	knows	himself	to	hold	in	a	way	that	no	one	else	could	know	this.	This	example	reveals	that	even	‘first-personal’	evidence	about	of	one’s	beliefs	is	not	sufficient	for	honest	assertion.		We	will	turn	in	§7	to	consider	whether	honest	assertion	might	be	grounded	in	some	other	sort	of	first-personal	evidence	than	that	which	the	Perceptive	Introspector	draws	on.	Before	that,	in	§6	we	consider	a	different	strategy	for	responding	to	our	argument.		6.	 Thus	far	we	have	argued	that	neither	merely	believing	something,	nor	believing	that	one	believes	it,	nor	knowing	that	one	believes	it,	nor	knowing	this	belief	on	the	basis	of	specifically	first-personal	evidence,	is	enough	to	make	possible	the	honest	assertion	of	a	belief.	It	might	seem,	however,	that	the	missing	element	we	have	thus	far	failed	to	discover	lies	not	in	the	relation	between	the	speaker	and	her	belief,	but	rather	in	the	relation	between	the	speaker	and	world.	Indeed,	we	observed	above	that	assertion,	i.e.	speaking	one’s	mind,	is	not	(in	general7)	a	way	of	speaking	about	one’s	mind.	When	we	express	our	beliefs	through	assertion,	we	do	this	by	speaking	about	the	objects	of	our	beliefs,	and	so	the	grounds	on	which	we	do	this	must	include	grounds	for	taking	these	objects	to	be	as	we	say	them	to	be.	But	evidence	that	one	believes	something	does	not	(in	general8)	provide	any	grounds	for	thinking	that	things	are	as	one	believes	them	to	be.		 This	diagnosis	suggests	a	way	of	rebutting	our	challenge	to	the	empirical	conception	of	self-knowledge.	Perhaps	the	problem	has	been	with	attempting	to	understand	the	honesty	of	assertion	simply	through	(BA),	a	norm	that	says	nothing	about	the	truth	of	one’s	beliefs—whereas	one	who	asserts	honestly	must	do	so	out	of	a	concern	that	she	say	what	is	true.	Given	this,	one	might	conclude	that	what	makes	honest	assertion	impossible	in	the	cases	described	above	is	only	that	these	subjects	would	violate	a	norm	against	asserting	falsehoods:		 	(TA)	Assert	that	p	only	if	p.		The	proposal	on	behalf	of	the	empirical	conception	would	then	be	this.	Honest	assertion	requires	not	only	following	(BA),	which	presupposes	a	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs,	but	also	following	(TA),	which	presupposes	a	grasp	of	the	fact	that	things	are																																																									7	The	obvious	exception	is	when	one	asserts	certain	sorts	of	things	about	oneself.	8	Here	the	exception	will	be	any	case	where	there	is	a	special	reason	to	believe	that	one’s	beliefs	are	correct.	
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as	one	believes	them.	The	Faithful	Patient	and	Perceptive	Introspector	fail	to	follow	(TA)—and	it	is	this,	rather	than	their	empirical	route	to	doxastic	self-knowledge	that	explains	why	they	cannot	assert	their	beliefs	honestly.	To	speak	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	belief,	as	honesty	requires,	is	to	speak	with	the	truth	of	the	believed	proposition	in	mind.	We	agree	that	an	aim	to	assert	only	what	is	true	is	among	the	conditions	of	honest	assertion.	We	deny,	however,	that	the	envisioned	appeal	to	(TA)	as	a	supplement	to	(BA)	offers	a	way	to	defend	the	empirical	conception.	This	is	because,	as	we	will	argue	below,	a	correct	understanding	of	(TA)	as	giving	a	requirement	of	honest	assertion	reveals	that	following	(TA),	properly	understood,	just	is	following	(BA),	properly	understood.	Furthermore,	this	internal	connection	between	belief	and	truth	as	conditions	of	honesty	cannot	be	understood	except	in	light	of	the	thesis	that,	in	paradigmatic	cases,	a	person	knows	her	own	beliefs	in	a	non-empirical	manner.	To	begin,	notice	that	as	(TA)	is	a	rule,	there	is	once	again	more	to	following	it	than	merely	conforming	to	it.	A	person	who	just	happens	to	assert	something	that	is	true—as	a	variant	on	the	Would-Be	Liar	perhaps	might9—has	not	thereby	asserted	honestly,	since	the	conformity	between	her	assertion	and	the	truth	will	have	been	an	accident.	Nor,	however,	is	it	enough	to	add	that	one	who	asserts	honestly	must	not	only	speak	the	truth	but	also	believe	what	she	asserts,	since	the	Would-Be	Liar	or	any	of	the	other	characters	above,	who	do	believe	what	they	assert,	could	happen	also	to	speak	truly	without	thereby	being	honest	in	their	assertions.	To	use	a	common	metaphor,	following	(TA)	means	asserting	what	is	true	in	a	way	that	aims	at	asserting	what	is	true:	and	this	‘aiming’	will	be	part	of	the	self-conscious	activity	of	the	speaker,	who	must	understand	herself	to	be	speaking	with	an	aim	of	being	truthful.	The	task	of	articulating	(TA)	as	a	condition	of	honesty	thus	raises	all	of	the	same	questions	that	arose	in	our	discussion	(BA).	It	cannot	help	us	to	resolve	them.	And	so	the	proposal	in	question	is	inadequate.	This	point	can	also	be	reached	from	the	opposite	direction.	Just	as	it	is	possible	to	conform	to	(TA)	without	following	it,	so	it	is	possible	to	try	to	follow	(TA)	but	fail	to	do	so.	Such	a	person	will	aim	at	the	truth	in	her	assertion	but	fail	to	hit	her	target;	she	will	assert	by	mistake	something	that	happens	to	be	false.	While	there	is	a	failure	here,	there	will	not	have	been	any	lapse	in	honesty.	And	the	intelligibility	of	this	form	of	failure	seems	to	turn	on	what	the	speaker	believes:	a																																																									9	We	have	in	mind	a	simple	case	where	someone	deliberately	asserts	the	opposite	of	something	she	falsely	believes.	What	she	says	will	be	true,	and	so	her	assertion	will	be	in	accordance	with	(TA),	but	she	will	not	have	followed	that	rule,	and	will	not	have	asserted	honestly.	We	take	no	stand	on	whether	such	an	assertion	counts	as	a	lie.	
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person	will	try	to	follow	(TA)	only	if	what	she	asserts	is	something	she	believes,	and	this	attempt	will	be	a	failure	if	her	belief	is	false.	But	once	again,	not	just	any	assertion	of	something	one	believes	will	amount	to	an	honest	attempt	to	follow	(TA),	as	the	examples	in	the	previous	section	make	clear:	e.g.	the	Perceptive	Introspector	will	not	even	have	tried	to	follow	(TA)	if	he	asserts,	merely	on	the	strength	of	the	‘internal’	evidence	revealing	his	belief,	that	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	The	truth	or	falsity	of	his	assertion	is	irrelevant	to	that	assessment.	We	are	now	in	a	position	to	see	why	the	envisioned	response	to	our	argument	cannot	succeed.	It	is	true	that	the	Perceptive	Introspector,	Faithful	Patient,	and	Lucky	Spiritualist	all	fail	to	satisfy	the	condition	on	truthfulness	given	in	(TA).		Each	of	them	asserts	what	he	believes,	and	does	so	because	he	understands	himself	to	believe	this,	but	does	not	aim	to	assert	only	what	is	true.	But	this	reveals	not	that	honest	assertion	has	a	truth-requirement	in	addition	to	the	requirement	to	assert	only	what	one	believes.	It	reveals	instead	that,	properly	understood,	the	truth-requirement	(TA)	and	the	belief-requirement	(BA)	are	different	ways	of	formulating	the	very	same	condition.		A	person	who	is	in	a	position	to	follow	the	norm	of	truth	as	stated	in	(TA)	must	know	not	only	how	things	are,	but	also	how	she	is,	in	respect	of	the	requirement	to	be	truthful.		This	is	brought	out	in	the	fact	that	a	person	who	asserts	dishonestly	what	turns	out	to	be	true	won’t	then	conclude	that	she	wasn’t	being	dishonest	after	all,	while	one	who	asserts	honestly	what	happens	to	be	false	may	retreat	to	the	judgment	that	she	believed	what	she	said,	and	so	at	least	wasn’t	being	dishonest.	But	we	have	yet	to	see	how	this	doxastic	self-knowledge	can	be	grounded	in	evidence,	including	evidence	of	a	specially	‘first-personal’	kind.	And	the	introduction	of	(TA)	does	not	close	that	gap.		 	7.	 We	argued	in	§2	that	in	order	to	assert	honestly,	a	speaker	must	not	only	believe	what	she	asserts,	but	must	also	grasp	the	fact	that	she	believes	this.	The	argument	of	§§3-5	questioned	whether	this	grasp	could	arise	from	an	empirical	process,	even	one	whose	nature	and	scope	were	distinctively	first-personal.	Our	conclusion,	which	we	work	out	in	more	detail	in	§8	below,	is	that	the	self-knowledge	that	grounds	the	possibility	of	honest	assertion	must	be	non-empirical.	But	first	we	will	consider	a	final	reply	on	behalf	of	the	empirical	conception.	The	reply	we	will	consider	begins	with	the	modest	idea	that	it	is	dishonest	to	assert	a	proposition	that	does	not	seem	to	one	to	be	true:		(SA)	Assert	that	p	only	if	p	seems	true.		The	next	step	in	this	reply	is	the	observation	that	since	people	tend	to	believe	the	things	that	seem	true	to	them,	the	fact	that	something	seems	to	one	to	be	true	can	provide	an	empirical	route	to	doxastic	self-knowledge—knowledge,	that	is,	that	one	
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believes	this	seemingly	true	thing.	And	the	final	step	is	the	observation	that	it	will	
not	seem	to	our	subject	in	the	Basic	Case,	or	any	of	our	variants	on	it,	as	if	he	had	an	unhappy	childhood.	Thus,	it	will	be	proposed,	the	true	lesson	of	these	cases	is	that	honesty	requires	that	the	asserted	proposition	seem	to	the	speaker	to	be	true,	and	that	its	seeming-to-be-true	be	part	of	the	speaker’s	route	to	knowledge	that	she	believes	it.	The	details	of	this	strategy	will	depend	in	part	on	how	one	explicates	the	relevant	sense	of	‘seems’.	One	way	is	phenomenological:		(SA-P)	Assert	that	p	only	if	p	phenomenally	seems	true.		The	concept	of	a	phenomenal	seeming—that	is,	a	proprietary	phenomenology	that	attends	to	actively	considering	and	affirming	the	truth	of	a	proposition—is	contentious,10	but	we	will	not	dwell	on	that	here.	We	note	only	that	this	first	interpretation	of	(SA)	can	be	contrasted	with	another	one,	where	a	person	understands	her	belief	not	through	a	bit	of	phenomenology	but	rather	through	an	
epistemic	status	that	links	her	belief	to	the	world:		(SA-J)	Assert	that	p	only	if	you	have	compelling	doxastic	justification	for	believing	that	p.	 	This	latter	condition	will	seem	plausible	insofar	as	we	observe	that	people	tend	to	believe	the	things	that	they	have	compelling	doxastic	justification	for	believing,	which	means	that	satisfying	(SA-J)	will	be	evidence	that	one	satisfies	the	condition	in	(BA).	However,	unlike	the	routes	to	self-knowledge	of	the	Faithful	Patient	and	Perceptive	Introspector,	the	possession	of	compelling	doxastic	justification	also	links	a	person	to	the	truth	of	what	she	believes,	perhaps	putting	her	in	a	position	to	assert	this	belief	honestly.			 Both	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	are	attractive	ways	to	explain	the	impossibility	of	honest	assertion	in	our	variations	on	the	Basic	Case,	since	as	we	have	granted	it	will	not	seem	to	the	Would-Be	Liar,	Lucky	Spiritualist,	Faithful	Patient,	or	Perceptive	Introspector	as	if	the	beliefs	they	assert	are	true,	nor	will	they	take	themselves	to	be	justified	in	holding	those	beliefs.	Given	this,	it	may	seem	that	(SA-P)	or	(SA-J),	separately	or	perhaps	in	combination,	identifies	the	privileged	empirical	route	to	self-knowledge	that	is	missing	in	those	cases.	But	we	will	argue	below	that	they	do	not.		 Our	initial	argument	for	this	conclusion	is	that	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	do	not	give	
necessary	conditions	for	honest	assertion:	that	is,	it	is	possible	to	assert	honestly																																																									10	For	doubts	about	this	idea,	see	Robinson	(2005)	and	Soteriou	(2007)		
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even	if	the	conditions	of	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	are	not	satisfied.	Consider	first	that,	according	to	(SA-P),	one	is	dishonest	if	one	makes	an	assertion	unaccompanied	by	a	phenomenal	seeming-true.	Some	doubt	whether	there	is	any	such	phenomenal	state.	But	even	the	non-doubters	couldn’t	plausibly	maintain	that	a	phenomenal	seeming	accompanies	every	occasion	of	honest	assertion.	Over	the	course	of	just	a	single	conversation,	we	might	make	dozens	of	assertions	about	matters	that	we	consider	settled,	and	we	may	not	be	actively	thinking	at	all	about	what	we	are	saying.	The	idea	that	each	such	assertion	will	be	dishonest	unless	accompanied	by	a	subjective	appearance	of	the	truth	of	the	asserted	proposition	is	absurd.	This	shows	that	it	is	possible	to	assert	honestly	without	satisfying	the	condition	in	(SA-P).		 (SA-J)	avoids	this	difficulty.	So	long	as	a	subject	makes	an	assertion	partly	in	light	of	her	justification	for	thinking	that	p	is	true,	she	will	be	following	(SA-J).	Her	justification	need	not	be	phenomenally	present	(whatever	that	might	mean);	all	that	matters	is	that	the	subject	understands	it	to	be	there.11	There	is,	however,	still	a	problem	with	this	condition,	namely	that	one	can	assert	something	honestly	without	taking	oneself	to	be	justified	in	believing	this.	For	it’s	not	particularly	unusual	that	one	believes	something	for	which	one	knows	one	lacks	justification.	If	one	asserts	such	a	belief,	then	others	might	find	fault	with	this,12	but	their	grounds	for	doing	so	could	not	rightly	include	one’s	having	been	dishonest—after	all,	what	one	asserted	is	exactly	what	one	believed,	and	one	asserted	it	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	belief	itself.	Honesty	does	not	require	asserting	only	what	one	takes	oneself	to	be	doxastically	justified	in	believing.	Even	if	the	knowledge	norm	for	assertion	involves	(SA-J),	the	requirements	of	honesty	do	not.		 We	take	these	defects	with	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	to	be	incontrovertible	and	fatal	to	the	reply	under	consideration.	There	is,	however,	a	more	general	problem	with	this	reply	that	we	think	is	worth	reflecting	on.	For	there	may	linger	in	the	mind	of	the	reader	a	thought	that,	even	if	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	do	not	work,	(SA)	itself	remains	unimpeached.	Behind	this	thought	lies	the	idea	that	(a)	the	doxastic	knowledge	necessary	for	following	(BA)	is	something	beyond	holding	the	belief	itself,	(b)	the	extra	factor	is	a	piece	of	evidence,	and	(c)	the	evidence	in	question	must	point	to	one’s	belief	‘from	the	inside’,	so	to	speak.	Condition	(c)	refers	to	the	‘seeming’	that	according	to	(SA)	is	a	requirement	of	honest	assertion.	Our	objections	to	(SA-P)	and	(SA-J)	may	thus	seem	not	to	impugn	this	intuition	as	such,	but	only	to	show	that	more	needs	to	be	done	to	articulate	the	relevant	sense	of	‘seems’.		
																																																								11	Two	obvious	questions	that	we	will	not	belabor:	On	what	basis	must	the	subject	understand	herself	to	be	doxastically	justified?	And	on	what	basis	must	she	understand	herself	to	believe	as	she	does	on	the	strength	of	this	justification?	12	Though	they	might	not	be	right	to—for	the	belief	might	be	‘properly	basic’.	
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	 The	work	required	to	achieve	this	would	be	considerable.	The	phenomenological	and	epistemic	routes	considered	above	are	hopeless.	Moreover,	one	can	make	trouble	for	(SA)	itself.	For	example,	even	if	a	philosopher	takes	herself	to	have	worked	out	a	convincing	proof	of,	say,	compatibilism	about	free	will,	she	might	nonetheless	find	that	the	proposition	‘Free	will	and	determinism	are	compatible’	seems	false—especially	if	she	has	not	recently	rehearsed	the	proof	for	herself.	Nonetheless,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	there	would	be	anything	dishonest	in	asserting	that	proposition,	if	in	fact	she	believes	it	in	the	face	of	the	recalcitrant	seeming.	If	this	is	correct,	then	it	is	possible	to	assert	something	honestly	even	if	it	seems	to	one	to	be	false.	But	let	us	put	these	worries	aside	and	focus	on	the	very	idea	that	the	way	things	seem	to	a	person	could	be	the	privileged	source	of	evidence	through	which	she	attains	non-alienated,	distinctively	first-personal	knowledge	of	her	belief.		 	The	deeper	problem	with	the	appeal	to	(SA)	as	a	defense	of	the	empirical	conception	is	that	there	is	no	good	reason	why,	if	honest	assertion	is	a	matter	saying	what	one	knows	oneself	to	believe	and	the	evidence	constituted	by	seeming-truth	is	good	enough	to	confer	this	knowledge,	then	evidence	of	other	kinds—i.e.,	the	kinds	operative	in	the	cases	of	the	Perceptive	Introspector	and	the	Faithful	Patient—wouldn’t	be	good	enough	as	well.	This	concern	is	especially	pressing	when	we	recognize	the	extent	to	which	how	things	seem	to	a	person	is	not	an	infallible	indication	of	what	she	believes,	as	the	Basic	Case	and	our	variants	on	it	all	bring	out.	If	we	accept	that	there	are	cases	where	a	belief	is	better	known	‘third-personally’	than	from	the	inside,	then	as	long	as	the	role	of	seeming-truth	in	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	understood	in	empirical	terms	there	is	no	reason	why	it	should	be	impossible	honestly	to	assert	a	belief	that	one	knows	of	only	through	these	other	kinds	of	evidence.	The	distinction	between	the	right	and	wrong	sorts	of	empirical	process	is	entirely	ad	hoc,	and	raises	the	suspicion	that	this	requirement	is	a	strained	attempt	to	accommodate	a	very	different	truth	using	the	wrong	set	of	resources.13		 We	conclude	that	(SA)	will	not	help	in	defending	the	empirical	conception	against	our	arguments.	It	is	time	to	propose	an	alternative.		 																																																									13	A	further	problem	with	this	reply	is	that	even	if	there	is	some	intuitive	pull	to	the	thought	that	honest	assertion	requires	the	seeming-truth	of	the	asserted	proposition,	there	is	none	at	all	to	the	idea	that	this	requirement	is	due	to	the	way	that	seeming-truth	provides	a	special	sort	of	evidence	for	what	one	believes.	If	the	proposal	in	question	were	correct	(as	we	have	argued	it	is	not),	it	would	be	correct	only	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	it	flies	in	the	face	of	the	phenomenology	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.		
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8.	 We	have	argued	that	the	empirical	conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	makes	it	impossible	to	understand	the	first-personal	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs	that	is	required	for	honest	assertion.	This	is	not	only	because	there	is	no	credible	account	of	the	empirical	process	that	could	permit	such	a	grasp,	but	also	because	the	idea	that	some	empirical	processes	can	ground	the	required	self-knowledge,	while	other	processes	that	are	otherwise	equally	reliable	will	not	do	in	this	respect,	is	unmotivated.	The	conclusion	we	draw	from	this	is	that	when	honest	assertion	is	possible	it	must	arise	from	a	grasp	of	one’s	beliefs	that	is	not	grounded	in	evidence	of	any	sort.	Following	Moran	(2001)	and	others,	we	can	state	this	conclusion	by	saying	that	ordinary	self-knowledge	of	one’s	beliefs,	i.e.	the	sort	of	assertion	that	allows	one	to	assert	those	beliefs	honestly,	is	transparent	to	belief	itself.		 The	idea	that	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	transparent	finds	a	classic	formulation	in	a	familiar	passage	from	Gareth	Evans’s	Varieties	of	Reference:		 	…	in	making	a	self-ascription	of	belief,	one’s	eyes	are,	so	to	speak,	or	occasionally	literally,	directed	outward—upon	the	world.	If	someone	asks	me	‘Do	you	think	there	is	going	to	be	a	third	world	war?’,	I	must	attend,	in	answering	him,	to	precisely	the	same	outward	phenomena	as	I	would	attend	to	if	I	were	answering	the	question	‘Will	there	be	a	third	world	war?	(Evans	[1982,	225]		Against	the	empirical	conception,	we	propose	that	it	is	only	when	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	transparent	to	belief	in	the	way	described	by	Evans	that	a	person	can	assert	her	belief	honestly.	Only	to	the	extent	that	a	person	knows	her	belief	transparently	can	she	follow	the	rule	(BA)	by	expressing	this	belief	in	honest	assertion,	speaking	from	its	point	of	view	just	as	Zoe	calls	the	zookeeper	because	she	believes	that	there’s	a	pink	elephant	in	the	bathtub.	One	who	speaks	in	this	way	is	not	merely	asserting	what	she	believes	(as	does	Would-Be	Liar	does),	is	not	merely	asserting	what	she	believes	or	knows	herself	to	believe	(as	do	the	Lucky	Spiritualist,	Faithful	Patient	and	Perceptive	Introspector).	She	is	asserting	that	p	in	light	of	the	(putative)	fact	that	p.	She	speaks	honestly,	because	she	is	speaking	from	the	point	of	
the	view	of	the	belief	she	expresses.	Still	one	might	wonder:	How	is	it	so	much	as	possible	that	a	person	could	have	non-empirical	knowledge	of	her	beliefs?	The	argument	of	this	paper	does	not	depend	on	any	specific	answer	to	this	question,	but	it	does	rule	out	a	misinterpretation	of	the	notion	of	transparency	that	has	gained	some	currency	in	
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the	literature.14	According	to	this	misinterpretation,	transparent	self-knowledge	arises	from	a	process	of	the	following	form:			
Step	1:	Consider	whether	p	is	true.		
Step	2:	If	it	is,	then	conclude	that	one	believes	that	p.		For	the	reasons	we	explained	in	§7,	we	agree	with	many	would-be	critics	of	the	transparency	method	that	it	is	incredible	that	such	a	process	should	be	the	ground	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.	That	is,	if	this	process	is	understood	so	that	the	judgment	(or	appearance	of	truth,	or	proposition	judged)	generated	in	Step	1	functions	as	evidence	justifying	the	doxastic	self-ascription	in	Step	2,	the	proposal	in	question	is	just	a	version	of	the	view	that	we	have	been	arguing	against.	It	is	not	an	account	of	non-empirical	self-knowledge.	However,	as	long	as	the	empirical	conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge	is	taken	for	granted,	it	will	seem	inevitable	that	the	method	of	transparency	should	be	construed	in	this	way—as	a	process	by	which	beliefs	about	one’s	own	beliefs	are	justified.	But	what	is	Evans	offering,	if	not	an	account	in	which	a	believer’s	view	‘on	the	world’	feeds	into	a	process	that	results	in	well-grounded	doxastic	self-ascriptions?	We	propose	that	the	key	to	avoiding	this	misinterpretation	is	to	see	that,	for	the	person	who	knows	her	belief	transparently,	the	judgments	‘p’	and	‘I	believe	that	p’	are	not	separable	in	the	way	that	the	empirical	conception	assumes	they	must	be.	To	say	that	these	judgments	are	not	separable	is	to	say	that,	for	the	self-knowing	believer,	the	questions	they	address—respectively,	whether	p	and	whether	she	believes	that	p—do	not	concern	distinct	matters,	such	that	her	answer	to	one	could	be	the	basis	of	her	answer	to	the	other.15		There	are	at	least	two	ways	that	this	inseparability	can	be	understood.	
Constitutivist	theories	hold	that	we	can	have	non-empirical	knowledge	of	our	beliefs	because	to	take	oneself	to	believe	something	is,	at	least	in	the	right	conditions,	also	to	believe	it.16	As	long	as	the	self-ascription	through	which	belief	is	supposed	to	be	constituted	is	not	grounded	empirically,	such	a	view	would	avoid	our	objections	to	the	empirical	conception.	We	note,	however,	an	important	barrier	to	making	good	sense	of	Constitutivist	proposals:	they	seem	to	require	seeing	doxastic	self-attribution	as	entirely	groundless,	as	the	product	of	a	brute	disposition																																																									14	For	misinterpretation	(or	creative	reconstruction)	along	these	lines,	see	Fernández	(2003);	Byrne	(2011);	Gertler	(2011,	188-190);	Cassam	(2014,	3-5	and	
passim).	15	Cf.	Moran	(2001,	§	2.6).	16	Recent	Constitutivist	proposals	include	Heal	(2001),	Schwitzgebel	(2011),	and	Coliva	(2012).	
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or	something	along	these	lines.17	This	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	the	empirical	conception	but	is	hardly	a	credible	interpretation	of	Evans’s	insight,	nor	do	we	find	it	to	possess	much	independent	plausibility	of	its	own.			An	alternative	to	Constitutivism	is	the	Self-Conscious	Conception	of	doxastic	self-knowledge.	This	conception	reverses	the	Constitutivist’s	order	of	explanation,	holding	that	it	is	in	the	nature	of	belief	to	be	self-conscious,	and	that	because	of	this	a	person	does	not	need	to	rely	on	introspection	or	any	other	empirical	process	as	a	source	of	knowledge	of	her	beliefs.	The	thought	is	not	that	(as	for	the	Constitutivist)	the	thinker	simply	finds	herself	believing	that	she	believes	that	p	and,	in	virtue	of	this	fact,	believes	that	p.	Rather,	according	to	the	Self-Conscious	Conception	a	person	is	ordinarily	in	a	position	to	grasp	what	she	believes	simply	in	virtue	of	believing	it,	as	it	is	part	of	what	it	is	to	view	a	proposition	with	the	belief-attitude	that	one	thereby	knows	oneself	to	so	view	it.	Developing	this	approach	in	detail	requires	explaining	how	it	could	be	in	the	nature	of	a	psychological	attitude	like	belief	to	be	non-empirically	self-known—a	task	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.18	Nothing	in	what	we	have	argued	here	bears	directly	on	the	question	of	which	of	these	accounts	(or	perhaps	some	other)	of	transparent	self-knowledge	is	the	right	one.	Our	central	contention	is	that	some	explanation	of	how	there	can	be	non-empirical	knowledge	of	belief	is	required	for	an	adequate	account	of	honest	assertion.	Full	development	of	this	position	is	work	for	another	occasion.			 	
																																																								17	Among	contemporary	Constitutivists,	Schwitzgebel	(2011)	is	notable	in	embracing	this	consequence.	18	See	Boyle	(2011)	and	Marcus	(2016)	for	work	in	this	vein.	
	 17	
	
References		Armstrong,	D.	M..	1973.	Belief,	Truth	and	Knowledge.	Cambridge	University	Press.		Boyle,	Matthew.	2011.	“Transparent	Self-Knowledge.”	Aristotelian	Society	
Supplementary	Volume	85	(1):223-241.		Byrne,	Alex.	2011.	“Transparency,	Belief,	Intention.”	Aristotelian	Society	
Supplementary	Volume	85	(1):	201-221.		Carruthers,	Peter.	2010.	“Introspection:	divided	and	partly	eliminated.”	Philosophy	
and	Phenomenological	Research	80	(1):	76-111.		Cassam,	Quassim.	2014.	Self-Knowledge	for	Humans.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Coliva,	Annalisa.	2011.	“One	variety	of	self-knowledge:	constitutivism	as	constructivism.”	In	The	Self	and	Self-Knowledge,	edited	by	Annalisa	Coliva.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Dancy,	Jonathan.	2000.	Practical	Reality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Evans,	Gareth.	1982.	Varieties	of	Reference.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Fernández,	Jordi.	2003.	Privileged	access	naturalized.	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	53	(212):	352-372.		Gertler,	Brie	2001a.	Self-Knowledge.	Routledge.		Gertler,	Brie.	2011b.	“Self-Knowledge	and	the	Transparency	of	Belief.”	In	Self-
Knowledge,	edited	by	Anthony	Hatzimoysis.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Goldberg,	Sanford.	2015.	Assertion:	On	the	Philosophical	Significance	of	Assertoric	
Speech.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Heal,	Jane.	2001.	“On	first-person	authority.”	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	102	(1):	1-19.		
	 18	
Kvanvig,	Jonathan	L.	2009.	“Norms	of	assertion.”	In	Assertion:	New	Philosophical	
Essays,	edited	by	Herman	Kappelan	and	Jessica	Brown.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Marcus,	Eric.	2016.	“To	believe	is	to	know	you	believe.”	dialectica	70	(3):	375–405.		Moran,	Richard.	2001.	Authority	and	Estrangement:	An	Essay	on	Self-Knowledge.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.		Robinson,	William.	2005.	“Thoughts	without	distinctive	non-imagistic	phenomenology.”	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	70	(3):	534-561.		Ryle,	Gilbert.	1949.	The	Concept	of	Mind,	New	York:	Barnes	and	Noble.		Schwitzgebel,	Eric.	2011.	Knowing	your	own	beliefs.	Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy	35:	41-62.		Schwitzgebel,	Eric,	and	Myers-Schulz,	Blake.	2013.	“Knowing	that	p	without	believing	that	p.”	Noûs	47	(2):	371-384.		Soteriou,	Mathew.	2007.	“Content	and	the	stream	of	consciousness.”	Philosophical	
Perspectives	21	(1):	543–568.		Weiner,	Matthew.	2005.	“Must	we	know	what	we	say?”	The	Philosophical	Review,	114:	227–51.		Williamson,	Timothy.	2000.	Knowledge	and	its	Limits.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		
